Abstract
Preface
I undertook this research project to educate and help prepare me for a visit to Ukraine under Air War College's Regional Study Program. My U.S. Air Force experience is related to space acquisition, and I wanted to learn about Ukraine's space and missile capabilities. Specifically, I wanted to understand how Ukraine was adapting its high level of technological expertise as a major designer and producer of Soviet satellites and missiles to the challenge of building a modern commercial space industry. Ukraine may be strongly tempted to sell its expertise and capabilities to "rogue" nations, but this would likely jeopardize its economic and political support from the U.S. and other Western nations. I became curious about how Ukraine was handling this dilemma, and how the U.S. was addressing it. The possibility of Ukrainian missile and technology proliferation is representative of many of the practical problems for the U.S. policy of engagement. 
Introduction
The "imperative of engagement" is fundamental to the United States' national security strategy and involves shaping the international environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests and security. Shaping the environment often requires balancing between competing and seemingly contradictory objectives. For example, the U.S. strategy is based on the principle that the "trend toward democracy and free markets throughout the world advances American interests." 1 At the same time, the U.S. recognizes that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose a major threat to global security, 2 and so the U.S. has aggressively negotiated agreements and treaties with other nations to control the proliferation of WMD capabilities and technology. As a result, nations that have advanced missile technology that might otherwise be sold for profit in a free market are highly discouraged by the U.S. from exploiting this economic opportunity.
Ukraine is an example of a newly-democratic nation whose economic development is encouraged and facilitated by the U.S. and other Western nations, but is also pressured by them to restrict potentially lucrative sales of its sensitive technologies. Ukraine is in the midst of a serious economic crisis, but it also possesses some of the world's most advanced and marketable missile and space technologies. Ukraine's space and missile expertise contributed immensely to the Soviet Union's sophisticated missile arsenal.
Ukrainian technological prowess also supported Soviet missile sales to nations like Libya, Iraq, and Iran, all of whom the U.S. and other Western nations view as regional security threats and are key subjects of WMD nonproliferation efforts. Restrictions on the sale of its missiles and missile-related technology, while essential for WMD nonproliferation, impacts Ukraine's economic growth opportunity.
This paper addresses U.S. incentives to influence Ukraine to support missile nonproliferation, and analyzes several disincentives for Ukraine to fully support U.S.
interests. Chapter 2 discusses the importance of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as an international missile nonproliferation mechanism, U.S. interests in encouraging Ukraine to join, and Ukraine's objections to joining. Chapter 3 examines
Ukraine's choppy progress in developing an export control system, which is a critical element for controlling its missile technology and implementing nonproliferation policy.
Chapter 4 discusses the U.S. incentives to convince Ukraine to support nonproliferation and join the MTCR. Chapter 5 addresses several disincentives that may impact Ukraine's full support for nonproliferation and its reasons for not joining the MTCR. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with an outlook for Ukraine's missile nonproliferation policy and what the U.S. could do to encourage Ukraine to strengthen it.
Notes The Missile Technology Control Regime
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is the cornerstone of U.S. policy on missile nonproliferation. The regime is a non-treaty association of nations with the goal of limiting the proliferation of rockets, missiles, unmanned air vehicles and related subsystems and technology applicable to the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The regime has established export control guidelines and a technical annex of controlled items. Each partner (i.e. the "members" in the language of the regime) implements the regime through its own national export control systems and applies sanctions based on its respective trade laws.
The regime distinguishes between two categories of sensitive missile items.
Category I includes complete rocket, missile and unmanned air vehicle systems, major subsystem components and key technologies associated with the capability to deliver at least a 500 kilogram (kg) payload at least 300 kilometers (km). 1 The regime presumes that each partner will strictly limit, if not totally deny, the export of Category I items.
Missile production facilities cannot be exported, according to the regime's guidelines. 2 Category II items include rockets, missiles and unmanned air vehicles which are capable of at least a 300 km range, as well as components and subsystems, such as propellants, materials, test equipment and flight instruments. 3 These items are considered only slightly less sensitive, and may be exported with careful consideration and assurance that the end user will not apply the items to any WMD program. The MTCR is not intended to impede international cooperation toward the development of peaceful space-related launch capabilities. But partners of the regime are expected to ensure that any exports of space-related technology, even if not explicitly included in the MTCR technical annex, are not used or diverted for WMD purposes. This assurance is achieved through the guarantees of the end user and monitoring by each nation's export control service.
The U.S., Canada, West Germany, Italy, Japan, France and the United Kingdom established the MTCR in 1987, and it has grown to 29 partners. 4 The partners approve the admission of new members and decide regime issues via consensus. While the regime does not provide explicit economic benefits to its partners, the incentives for joining include promotion of international security through nonproliferation, enhanced standing and respectability in the international community, and the increased opportunities for technological cooperation and information sharing "within the club."
The transfer of technology between MTCR partners is often facilitated and expedited by the mutual understanding and confidence between the partners.
In 1993 the U.S. became concerned that some governments were attempting to join the regime in order to gain access to advanced missile technologies unavailable to them outside the regime. The danger, in the Clinton Administration's view, was that the MTCR would turn into a missile technology bazaar. 5 To prevent any erosion of the regime's nonproliferation goal, President Clinton issued a policy in September 1993 whereby the U.S. requires all prospective new partners to eliminate their current, and renounce any future, Category I missile programs. In addition, new partners must have effective export controls and be members in good standing of other nonproliferation agreements, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. 6 The consensus rule governing MTCR decisions enables the U.S.
to effectively impose its policy on the accession of all new partners.
Ukraine's partnership would strengthen the MTCR, particularly since it has extensive expertise in the design and manufacturing of the type of missiles the regime is most concerned about controlling. Another concern is Ukraine's possession of 130 operational SCUD-B ballistic missiles (with greater than a 500 kg payload/300 km capability), which it inherited with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 7 However, Ukraine has so far been unwilling to give up its short-range ballistic missile systems and manufacturing capabilities, as the U.S. MTCR policy requires of prospective new members. The U.S.
has been unwilling to make an exception for Ukraine because it does not want to encourage additional ballistic missile programs. 8 The two countries are at an impasse.
Ukraine's Space and Missile Expertise -Concern and Opportunity
Ukraine is very proud and protective of its space and missile industry and its accomplishments. The major enterprises devoted to the Ukrainian missile and space program are the Yuzhnoye design bureau and the Yuzhmash manufacturing plant (hereafter both will be referred to simply as Yuzhnoye) located in the city of Dnipropetrovsk Yuzhnoye is Ukraine's largest aerospace enterprise. With its two million square feet of floor space, it is also the largest facility of its kind in the world. At its peak employment, prior to Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union, Yuzhnoye employed 50,000 workers, but that number had come down to about 34,000 employees by 1996. 9 The design and manufacturing facilities have existed for over 40 years and were 
Weapons Denuclearization Sets the Precedent for Missile Controls
When Ukraine declared its independence in August 1991, it had on its territory the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. 12 It inherited 176 Soviet strategic nuclear missiles (SS-19's and SS-24's, both with multiple independently targetable warheads), 30 strategic bombers, and approximately 1900 strategic and 2500 tactical nuclear warheads. 13 In 1991 Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuk, declared that Ukraine should have the status of a "non-nuclear state," and that Ukraine would abide by the arms control treaties that were signed by the Soviet Union. 
Policy Divergence on Ukraine's MTCR Partnership
Ukraine is strongly opposed to the U.S. MTCR admission policy because it believes, first, Ukraine may need its own short-range Category I missiles for deterrent purposes; second, the MTCR is an export control regime, not a missile disarmament treaty; third, the U.S. policy is discriminatory in nature because it is not applied to all MTCR members (including Russia, which agreed to follow MTCR guidelines before the new U.S. policy was established, but formally applied for membership afterwards); and fourth, Ukraine has a mature missile and space industry and it is unwilling to accept restrictions now that could constrain future development programs and possibly lead to further displacement of workers. 18 Given its disagreement with the U.S. policy for MTCR admission, Ukraine has sought to establish a legal basis for maintaining its current missiles and leaving open the option of developing new missiles.
As a successor state to the Soviet Union, Ukraine is obliged under the Intermediaterange Nuclear Forces treaty (INF) not to produce or deploy ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 km. 19 But Ukraine is under no treaty obligation to restrict conventional missiles with ranges under 500 km, and so the government has adamantly defended its legal right to maintain such a capability. A 500 km range, incidentally, would be sufficient to reach Moscow.
Ukraine's missile policy preserves the current SCUD-B's and the country's missile design and manufacturing capabilities for potential future programs. The U.S. is concerned that these capabilities increase the risk of proliferation, even though Ukraine has pledged not to export its missiles and sensitive technology. Ukraine's economic crisis and its need to raise hard cash may tempt it to sell its missiles and technology to "rogue" nations like Libya, Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and other nations of concern, such as India, Pakistan and China.
The fulfillment of Ukraine's pledge to adhere to MTCR provisions depends on the commitment of government and industry officials to ensure sensitive items and technologies are carefully controlled and do not get transferred to the "wrong" user. To this end, the U.S. has closely monitored and assisted the evolution of Ukraine's export control system. 
Notes Notes

The Evolution of Ukrainian Export Controls
When it was a Soviet republic, Ukraine had no need to establish and manage an export control system because the central authorities in Moscow administered Soviet exports. With its independence, Ukraine inherited a substantial military industrial base of 1840 enterprises employing 2.7 million people.
1 Ukrainian enterprises also accounted for one third of the factories in the Soviet military-industrial complex.
2 But independence also created a dire financial situation for Ukraine because its economy was no longer supported by the Soviet system. Military-industrial exports fell from $1.5 billion in 1990 to $300 million in 1992. 3 Gross domestic product between 1990 and 1993 fell by 36 percent, with inflation in 1993 averaging 70-90 percent per month. 4 Ukraine understands the critical importance of boosting its exports in order to inject hard currency into the economy. However, after independence, it had no export control infrastructure and had to develop one from the ground up.
Ukraine took its first legal steps for controlling exports in April 1991, when the Ukrainian Parliament passed the Act on Foreign Economic Activity. The act specified that the export and import of weapons, nuclear and other explosive material and sensitive technologies for producing weapons required state authorization. This act was adopted while Ukraine was still part of the Soviet Union but its intent was to establish Ukraine's sovereignty and prevent uncontrolled withdrawal of commodities to Russia. 5 just over a year ago, Ukrainian officials now consider it "monopolistic," and are allowing a number of the major arms enterprises to market their own products directly to foreign buyers. With Ukraine's arms sales reaching $185 million in 1996, making the country one of the top ten arms sellers in the world, the government does not want to limit the competitiveness of its arms industry. 9 As stated by Vasyl Hureyev, the Ukrainian Minister of Industrial Policy, "The bigger the number of competitive companies and enterprises operating on the foreign market, the easier the task of conquering that market." 
The Effectiveness of the Ukrainian Export Control System
Ukrainian authorities appear to understand the importance of a robust export control system and have taken steps to establish the organizational structures to implement such a system. Their aim has been to establish an export control system that is up to international standards to minimize the risk of proliferation, and to protect the economic interests of Ukraine by limiting technology leakage. Given the fact that seven years ago Ukraine did not have any significant export control infrastructure and experience, it is not surprising that its progress has evolved from various export commissions and it has experimented, for example, with different implementations of the export/import company concept. It is understandable that its evolving export system has undergone transformation and change.
One positive factor is that Ukraine has been receptive to Western technical advice, particularly from the U.S. For example, under the CTR program Ukraine has received about $13 million of assistance for organizing and modernizing its export control system. 13 According to The Center for International Trade and Security, a U.S. research organization at the University of Georgia that monitors and studies nonproliferation and export control issues, Ukraine has improved its export control system in a number of areas, such as licensing, training, control lists, verification, and customs authorities. 
Incentives for Missile Nonproliferation and MTCR Partnership
Ukraine's missile nonproliferation commitment and its partnership in the MTCR are two related issues but they need to be addressed separately from the standpoint of incentives. Incentives for nonproliferation need to focus on 1) shaping Ukraine's perspective toward those countries that pose a regional security threat with their missile capabilities; and 2) providing meaningful and long-lasting financial alternatives to selling missiles and technology to these countries. The objective of U.S. efforts to shape an enduring and self-sustaining Ukrainian nonproliferation policy is to ensure that Ukraine does not yield to temptations to sell its sensitive missile technologies to rogue states and other nations of concern.
Incentives for encouraging Ukraine's partnership in the MTCR need to address its defense and sovereignty concerns, which are at the heart of its refusal to accept the U.S. 
Incentives for Nonproliferation
The U.S. and other Western nations recognize the significance of providing ample opportunities to channel Ukraine's advanced space and missile expertise into "acceptable" commercial and international cooperative space efforts. Ukraine is very eager to develop space-related partnerships with Western businesses and organizations because they can provide a source of much-needed funding and marketing exposure for Ukrainian technical capabilities.
The 1994 election of Ukraine's second president, Leonid Kuchma, gave a significant boost to the space sector. Kuchma and about fifty other high-ranking politicians, are referred to by the Ukrainian media as the "clan from Dnepropetrovsk [sic]," for they all have close ties to the missile and defense industries in that city. 1 
Kuchma was
Yuzhnoye's director for eleven years and is a staunch promoter of Ukraine's space capabilities. He and the government believe that the development of a competitive space industry is of crucial importance to improving the country's difficult economic situation, promoting other related industries, and contributing to Ukraine's international standing. 
Commercial Launch Incentives
In 1994 President Kuchma and President Clinton signed an "umbrella" space agreement that empowered each nation's space agencies to collaborate directly on joint projects without having to consult constantly with their respective heads of state. and about 2800 kg into geosynchronous orbit. 6 The Zenit will also be busy in 1998 with three scheduled launches of 36 Globalstar cellular communications satellites. The Zenit is a highly automated launching system, and will adapt Ukraine's expertise in multiple, independently-targeted warhead technology to the task of deploying twelve commercial Globalstar satellites per launcher.
In addition to its commercial commitments with U.S. companies, Ukraine's space industry has also negotiated launch arrangements with Chile and Russia, and supports the international consortium that will develop the International Space Station. 7 For example, 
U.S. Financial Incentives
U.S. financial assistance to Ukraine provides another opportunity to help shape its nonproliferation policies. Ukraine is the third largest recipient of U.S. aid, receiving nearly $1.4 billion since 1992. 8 Nearly $450 million of this assistance has been provided under the CTR program for a broad range of activities, including nuclear weapons dismantlement, strategic missile and aircraft dismantlement, defense conversion, and export control implementation. U.S. assistance has enabled Ukraine to fulfill its goals of becoming a non-nuclear weapons state and to help build its market-based economy. The NATO-Ukraine Charter, which was signed on 9 July 1997, offers another incentive for Ukraine to subscribe to Western standards of nonproliferation. The agreement recognizes that a strong, enduring relationship between NATO and Ukraine is essential to the security of Europe and Ukraine. The charter promotes consultation and cooperation on defense and security issues, provides for the establishment of a Ukrainian military liaison mission at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and provides for a crisis consultative mechanism "whenever Ukraine perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity." 10 Highlighting the importance of the charter to Ukraine, President Kuchma stated that "the formation of a favorable international environment gives us an opportunity to focus on resolving the topical internal problems, first of all, to continue profound transformation in our economy and further democratization of our society." 11 With the desirability and benefits of its developing relationship with NATO, Ukraine is certainly less likely to support WMD proliferation, knowing this would be counter to the policies of its Western partners.
Shaping Ukraine's National Defense and Regional Security Perspective
Chapter 5
Disincentives for Ukrainian Missile Nonproliferation and Joining MTCR
Ukraine is not going to construct its strategic partnership with the United
States on the basis of Washington's unilateral demands.
-Ukrainian President Kuchma, 1997
Notwithstanding Ukraine's 1994 agreement to abide by the MTCR guidelines, there are still some practical concerns regarding Ukraine's commitment to proliferation. The effectiveness of any export control system is only as good as the commitment of government and industry to abide by it, and not bypass it for the sake of business. In
Ukraine's struggling economy, the lure of hard cash in return for sensitive missile technology is especially tempting, and is thus a disincentive for upholding nonproliferation.
The disincentives for Ukraine to give up its missile capabilities in order to join the MTCR are that it believes it needs the missiles for its defense and that it has a legal and sovereign right to them.
A Different Ukrainian Perspective on Proliferation
Other than the economic disincentive for supporting nonproliferation, another factor that may weaken Ukraine's commitment is its perception of the security threat posed by those nations who are the subject of Western nonproliferation policy. The U.S. and other Western nations have focused on preventing the proliferation of WMD-related missile technology and systems to "rogue" nations, such as Libya, Iraq, Iran, Syria and North Korea, as well as to other nations of security concern, such as India, Pakistan, and China.
All these nations have been eager to acquire advanced missile systems and technology for WMD purposes, and are considered to be threatening to regional stability. Yet, many of these nations were principal customers of the Soviet Union's missile industry, which means they were also customers, to a great degree, of the Ukrainian missile industry.
Thus, Ukraine's perspective on these nations would naturally be conditioned by its historical economic and military relationships with them. Even today, for example, Ukraine still maintains economic ties with and sells military small arms to Iran, and is helping Syria maintain and upgrade its tank force. 1 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Ukrainian perspective on the security threat posed by these countries may not exactly mirror Western views.
Alexander Negoda, director general of the National Space Agency of Ukraine commented in 1995 that "For other countries, transfer of their missile technologies means transfer of secrets and a threat to their national security interests. For Ukraine, there is no direct threat to its national security from the sales of its missiles and related technologies. That makes Ukraine a unique country. In fact, having taken obligations on missile nonproliferation, Ukraine contributes to the security of other countries more than it does for its own security." "from a proliferation standpoint, a serious concern arises from the presence of corruption coupled with organized crime. Many high-ranking officials are taking advantage of the absence of comprehensive export control legislation...the severe economic crisis in Ukraine has threatened the political survival of the President, the government, and the Parliament, and it is very hard to make a decision to restrict exports, since exports create jobs and are expected to improve the Ukrainian economy." 4 It is difficult to assess how much "leakage" of sensitive technologies has occurred or may be occurring. A 1996 Ukrainian press article, for example, suggested that no more than 20 percent of total arms export operations in Ukraine were conducted by official government export authorities, with the remainder handled by "shadow" structures operating with "highly positioned" sponsors. 5 According to the article, the shadow sector "skillfully evades taxes, selling its products through various sham firms...high profits help the shadow sector employ Ukraine's best brains and easily overcome any obstacles due to support from top level officials." 6 Shadow exports from Ukraine since independence have reportedly exceeded $2 billion. 7 While Ukraine has progressed in developing an export control system, and has made commitments to uphold several international nonproliferation and arms control agreements, its actions have reportedly not been consistent with these commitments. The Chinese have also been keenly interested in obtaining technology and data from Ukraine and Russia on ICBM's. In January 1996 three Chinese nationals visiting
Yuzhnoye were caught with documents related to the design of ICBM engines. 10 In mid-1996, after a leaked U.S. intelligence report revealed that China was exploring the possibility of buying SS-18 components and technology, the U.S. issued demarches to both Russia and Ukraine to convey its strong opposition to any such transfer and to remind them that such transfer would be contrary to their nonproliferation commitments.
Russia is the only country that has the Ukrainian-built SS-18's.
In December 1996 the Washington Times wrote, based on data reportedly provided by the CIA, that Ukraine has agreed to sell short-range ballistic missiles to Libya and service several of its Russian-made submarines as part of a military cooperation agreement. 11 The Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S. denounced the entire story as "complete nonsense," and reiterated Ukraine's commitment to responsible international behavior and to nonproliferation of WMD. 12 Victor Vashchilin, Chairman of the State Export Control Service has also stated that Ukraine complies "precisely with international control procedures" and that its "main objective is to support the national interests and security of Ukraine, not creating a threat by the sale of weapons to regions where they would contribute to a destabilization of the situation." 13 Since the initial Washington Times article, there has not been any significant open-press confirmation of the allegations nor any apparent negative fallout in the U.S. relationship with Ukraine,
suggesting that the original article may have been erroneous.
While economic incentives for proliferation certainly exist, it is difficult to conclude that there is a serious and systematic problem of WMD proliferation by the Ukrainians.
Despite the public commitments that Ukrainian leaders have made to upholding nonproliferation, it is still possible that, in some instances, they may be willing to allow sensitive technology to escape serious scrutiny in order to make a sale.
In general, Ukraine's supportive nonproliferation policy has led to a closer relationship with the West, opening up markets to Ukraine's space industry, expanding business opportunities, and bringing in direct financial assistance. In the unlikely event this relationship and its economic benefits were to deteriorate, Ukraine might then reverse its commitment to nonproliferation. Given this scenario, Ukraine would have a disincentive to support nonproliferation because unrestricted space and missile sales to countries such as Libya, Iran, China, and India, for example, would make up for some of the lost business and income from the West. Ukrainian government and industry officials have made it clear that they are eager for increased space cooperation with the U.S. and other Western countries, but without such cooperation, they would not hesitate to market their space services to other countries without regard to those countries' proliferation records.
14
Disincentives for Ukraine to Join the MTCR
Ukraine does not believe it has to join the MTCR to support missile nonproliferation.
Although it is not opposed to the MTCR, it is unwilling to accept the U.S. condition that it give up its Category I missile programs to join the regime. There are two basic disincentives for joining under these conditions. Only a few years ago, nationalist voices in the Russian parliament were arguing that the Crimean area, which has a predominantly ethnic Russian population, and was ceded to Ukraine by Russia in 1954, should be part of the Russian Federation. 19 Crimea, as well, has sought increasing political autonomy from the Ukrainian government and has its own parliament. The status of the 300-ship Black Sea Fleet was the subject of a longrunning dispute between Ukraine and Russia, although an agreement accompanying the recent friendship treaty has helped resolve this.
Ukraine's population is about 22 percent ethnic Russian, mostly established in the Crimean area and in eastern Ukraine. 20 The ethnic Russian population does not necessarily view Russia as an imperialist power, in contrast to the larger Ukrainian nationalist population in the west-central part of the country. 21 Although serious ethnic conflict has not occurred within Ukraine since independence, this is still a potential flashpoint, particularly if Ukraine's economic situation deteriorates. Ethnic tensions in Ukraine might induce Russia to become involved if it felt the ethnic Russian minority were ill-treated. Ukraine's dependence on Russia for more than 80 percent of its energy may also become a source of future tension if Russia decided to use it as a lever to influence Ukraine's policies. 22 Therefore, while relations with Russia and Ukraine's neighbors are improving,
Ukraine is still maintaining a cautious perspective, which is why it has been adamant about preserving its missile capabilities as a possible deterrent.
Notes
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The U.S. policy of engagement may appear contradictory with regard to Ukraine because the U.S. is anxious to facilitate Ukraine's economic development, while, on the other hand, it wants Ukraine to give up its potentially lucrative missile industry. But, in reality, there is no contradiction when these policies are viewed in the context of U.S.
efforts to shape the evolution of Ukraine's policies and behavior. The U.S. certainly wants to facilitate the development and reform of Ukraine's economy because this will enhance stability and support the process of democratization. But U.S. support for Ukrainian economic development is also constrained by U.S. WMD nonproliferation interests. Even though Ukraine might benefit economically from foreign missile technology sales, the U.S. is adamantly opposed to this. And though Ukraine has pledged not to export its missile technology, the U.S. is still concerned about the temptations and potential for leakage.
As part of its overall WMD counterproliferation effort, the U.S. is intent on reducing the availability of ballistic missile capabilities and technologies in the world. For this reason it has unilaterally imposed the requirement that new MTCR partners must renounce their Category I missile programs. Even though this requirement is currently unacceptable to Ukraine, the U.S. has been unwilling to make an exception for the sake of gaining Ukraine's admission. The U.S. does not want other nations to question its lack of firmness in seeking reductions in worldwide ballistic missile capabilities.
Ukraine's partnership in the MTCR would strengthen the regime, but it is not critical.
Ukraine's pledge to adhere to the MTCR guidelines theoretically brings its export control behavior into conformity with the regime. The U.S. is counting on Ukraine to uphold this commitment. The U.S. has not and should not make a major political issue over Ukraine's unwillingness to give up its missile programs. The overall positive U.S.-Ukrainian relationship is too important to be disrupted over the MTCR impasse.
Ukraine's complaints about discrimination because Russia has not had to give up its As its economic, political and military relationships with other nations become stronger and more productive, Ukraine will hopefully conclude that its missile program is a relic of its past. It may want to remove this reason for other nations to potentially have any lingering doubts about its commitment to missile nonproliferation. Willingly eliminating its missiles under peaceful conditions would be just as much a reflection of its sovereignty as retaining the missiles. The U.S. must continue to engage Ukraine to ultimately help it make such a decision with confidence and security.
